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Rationing in the Time of COVID and 




With surges in COVID-19 cases threatening to overload 
some hospital facilities, we must face the possibility that 
therapeutic treatments will need to be rationed, at least in some 
places. I do not propose any particular ideal rationing scheme 
but caution strongly against adopting a position that Professor 
Bagenstos advocated this past spring, rejecting rationing on the 
basis of patient life expectancy simply because life expectancy 
based rationing might threaten the factual interests of those with 
disabilities and might conceivably be implemented by those 
making judgments that were not simply inaccurate but grounded 
in biased, unacceptably discriminatory intuitions that some 
decision makers would have about the life expectancy of those 
with disabilities. My view is that Professor Bagenstos does not 
make either considered normative or empirical arguments that 
attending to the factual interests of those with disabilities or 
protecting against the possibility of discriminatory 
implementation of a plan should trump all other considerations; 
instead, he is “performing” his rhetorical commitment to a 
subordinated community as though that commitment functioned 
in the same way as a formal, normatively and factually defended 
side constraint on action would function. 
 
 
 * James C. Gaither Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Stanford Law 
School. The author wishes to thank Barbara Fried and Pam Karlan for helpful 
comments. Errors, of course, remain mine. 
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As hospitals in different regions once more face a crush of 
COVID cases, the possibility of needing to ration ICU care (or 
ventilators, or, more plausibly, scarce but promising 
therapeutics) that was mooted this past spring in Yale Law 
Journal’s online forum1 is arising once again.2 Of course, it 
would be ideal if all patients who could benefit from the 
treatment that would most likely be maximally efficacious for 
that patient could receive it, whether at the hospital nearest 
them or by being transported to a less stressed facility, but care 
rationing may either be essentially unavoidable (we cannot 
move all the patients who overstress a particular facility to a 
less overburdened one in a timely fashion) or be seen, by at least 
some observers, as ethically justified (because the resources 
that would be spent getting a patient maximally efficacious care 
might better be devoted to other life-saving projects or social 
projects thought more worthy than extending life, or increasing 
the low probability of survival in the way it would be extended 
or increased for the particular patient).3   
 Figuring out how best to ration scarce medical care is 
enormously difficult, and I have no faith that any scheme one 
might propose would be the best one. What I do have faith in is 
that the way that Professor Bagenstos approached the problem 
in his spring commentary rejecting schemes of the sort that 
 
 1. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Gets the Ventilator? 
Disability Discrimination in COVID-19 Medical-Rationing Protocols, 130 
YALE L.J.F. 1 (2020); Govind Persad, Disability Law and the Case for 
Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 YALE L.J.F. 26 (2020). 
 2. Health officials in Utah predicted in late October that they would 
need to ration care within a week if hospitalizations continued to spike, noting 
that their protocols suggested allocating care to those more likely to survive 
COVID if cared for. See Erin Alberty and Sean P. Means, Utah’s hospitals 
prepare to ration care as a record number of coronavirus patients flood their 
ICUs, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/NMQ9-YSTQ (“With 
new coronavirus cases shattering records on a daily basis, Utah’s hospitals are 
expected to begin rationing care in a week or two.”). Age might be used as a 
proxy for survival likelihood, but there is no suggestion that if two patients 
were equally (un)likely to survive COVID, the hospital would allocate care to 
the person whose life expectancy was otherwise shorter. See id. (summarizing 
the four-step process that Utah health officials will follow if the state needs to 
ration ICU resources). 
 3. A very thoughtful defense of the idea that it is improper to spend 
limitless amounts on any particular life-saving venture is made in Barbara H. 
Fried, What Does Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem (Or Letting It 
Die), 62 PHIL. Q. 505, 509–17 (2012). 
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Professor Persad proposed that account for the life expectancy 
of patients is a very bad way to approach it.4 
Professors Bagenstos and Persad agree on many key points: 
one could legally (given each author’s view of current law) and 
legitimately (given each author’s preferred normative scheme) 
choose to allocate a scarce ventilator (or presumably whatever 
scarce resources we now feel are effective in treating the 
disease) to X rather than Y if Y would either not benefit at all 
from the resource (i.e., the treatment itself would be 
inefficacious5) or would die in the very short run regardless of 
whether he received the ventilator (i.e., Y is terminally ill).6 
They also agree that it would be inappropriate to weigh the 
quality of each patient’s remaining life years if we do think that 
life expectancy is relevant at all, believing that “able bodied” 
decision makers will systematically underestimate the quality 
 
 4. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18–20 (explaining the problems 
inherent to Professor Persad’s “quantity-of-life” rationing approach). 
 5. Each author seems to treat inefficacy in a more binary fashion than I 
would, but neither is explicit about his view on this issue: it might well be the 
case that Y could benefit from the treatment but that the probability that he 
would is much lower than the probability that X would. Since Bagenstos seems 
to treat rationing decisions based on current efficacy of treatment as 
presumptively legitimate, I take him to accept that X has a claim to treatment 
if an unprejudiced clinician would determine that it is (significantly?) more 
likely that the treatment will succeed for him than for Y. 
  Bagenstos does not address a related (and important) problem that I 
also largely leave aside although I hope readers will see the relevance of some 
of the discussion in this essay to this problem: What do we do if we can treat 
disabled patients as successfully as we treat non-disabled patients only if we 
devote more resources to their treatment so that, under certain circumstances, 
treating a single disabled patient might preclude the treatment of two, rather 
than one, non-disabled patients? For further discussion, see especially infra 
note 35. Persad does address this issue, arguing briefly that hospitals can 
justifiably devote resources to a patient who requires fewer resources in order 
to make more resources available to others. Persad, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 6. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that it may be 
permissible to ration “where an individual’s underlying disability makes the 
individual unable to benefit from coronavirus treatment—either because that 
disability interferes with the treatment itself, or because the underlying 
disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of the 
treatment’s success in addressing the virus”). Persad believes this sort of 
rationing scheme—which he dubs “minimal triage”—is insufficient, but he 
does not seem to oppose it. Persad, supra note 1, at 28. 
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of life that people with “disabilities” actually experience.7 And 
they agree that one cannot use disability status directly to make 
 
 7. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4 (“[A] proper interpretation of 
the law requires assurances that such imminent-death determinations will be 
made based on the best available objective evidence, free from bias against 
people with disabilities or devaluation of their lives.”), with Persad, supra note 
1, at 30 (“I likewise agree . . . that quality-of-life judgments are likely to 
incorporate unjust biases that preclude their use in pandemic triage.”). 
Bagenstos has written in the past that non-disabled actors will judge the 
quality of life of those with disabilities by reference to their aversion to 
becoming disabled. See Samuel R. Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, Hedonic 
Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 769 
(2007) (explaining that people without disabilities “tend to believe that 
disability inevitably has a very negative effect on the enjoyment and quality 
of one’s life”). These ex ante preferences to avoid disability, though, unduly 
ignore hedonic adaptation—the tendency that people have to return to the 
same mildly positive hedonic state after either good events, which improve 
one’s overall hedonic state less than people expect, or bad ones, which have 
fewer negative hedonic consequences than people anticipate. Id. at 761–69 
(summarizing the existing literature that establishes that people with 
disabilities experience a higher-than-expected level of happiness). Because 
those without disabilities improperly assess the quality of life enjoyed by those 
who are disabled (and because treating becoming disabled as “tragic” 
reinforces destructive views that disability is a problem that inheres in the 
disabled individual rather than the failure of the community generally to 
accommodate those with different abilities), jurors should be forbidden to 
award hedonic damages to those who have suffered disabling injuries. Id. at 
797 (“Incorporating the views of people without disabilities in the law distracts 
attention from the social choices that attach disadvantage to disability, and it 
may itself inflict hedonic harm on people with disabilities.”). 
  I agree with both Professors Bagenstos and Persad that rationing 
COVID treatment resources by reference to QALY (quality adjusted life years) 
is problematic. I do so in part because the actual experiences of people with 
disabilities will likely not be properly heard and accounted for by those 
bureaucrats charged with measuring the quality of experience and in part 
because I am not convinced that anything that any single one of us (or a 
collective body made up of people with particular views of what made life of 
higher quality) would dub a “higher quality” life (unlike “years of life”) is what 
John Rawls would have called a “primary good,” a good that anyone would 
want regardless of her particular aims. (To be alive rather than not 
alive — that is, having more life—is something that permits anyone to meet 
whatever particular aims she has during the period she is alive. On the other 
hand, not everyone will think it is advantageous to have an additional year of 
what someone else calls a higher quality life than another year of what you 
yourself believe to be a higher quality experience.) See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 92 (1971) (explaining that primary goods are “things which it is 
supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants”). Having said that, I 
should note that I think that Bagenstos misuses what is itself a quite 
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rationing decisions, even if one were doing so believing it was a 
proxy for shorter life expectancy (rather than manifesting even 
more clearly impermissible animus towards those with 
disabilities or dismissal of the value of their lives).8 
 
problematic literature on hedonic adaption in his attack on assessing the 
experience of those with disabilities. I briefly explore some of the problems 
with the claim in the conventional literature on hedonic adaptation that 
becoming disabled does not adversely impact subjectively experienced welfare 
levels in Mark Kelman, Hard Choices and Deficient Choosers, 14 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 191, 213–20 (2019) and explore the problems at more length in 
Mark Kelman, Injuries ch. 3 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). The hedonic adaptation literature is also critiqued in Rick Swedloff & 
Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 
553, 564–67 (2010). 
 8. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 3–4 (arguing that “disability-based 
distinctions” in rationing violate the law). Persad also argues that decision 
makers are required to make individualized judgments about life expectancy, 
rather than relying on (even true) generalizations about the traits of members 
of subordinated groups. See Persad, supra note 1, at 31–32 (proposing that 
decision makers should employ “medically relevant information” and exclude 
irrelevant factors like disability status); id. at 48 
[E]vidence-based triage involves individualized determinations, not 
categorical denial of treatment to cystic fibrosis patients [a group of 
disabled patients that Bagenstos had discussed]. . . . [D]enying 
lifesaving treatment to the cystic fibrosis patients whose disability 
makes them comparatively unlikely to benefit could save more 
patients with cystic fibrosis who are nevertheless likely to benefit. 
This outcome is achievable under evidence-based triage, which 
considers individualized evidence about benefit . . . . 
Early on in employment discrimination law, employers were quite 
appropriately forbidden to rely on true generalizations about the job-relevant 
traits of members of the plaintiff class when they could instead make more 
individualized assessments: thus, for instance, the fact that women as a group 
might possess less of the upper body strength relevant to a particular job did 
not permit them to refuse to hire women, rather than administer strength 
tests to each applicant. See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 
235–36 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the court 
should assume “on the basis of a ‘stereotyped characterization’ that few or no 
women can safely lift 30 pounds, while all men are treated as if they can”); 
Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 280–81 (6th Cir. 1978) 
Even a bona fide lifting requirement cannot be implemented by the 
blanket exclusion of all females. Rather, it may be implemented 
only by a valid test measuring strength directly. Regardless of the 
difficulty of measuring individual characteristics, Title VII 
prohibits the use of popular stereotypes or even statistical data to 
“attribute general group characteristics to each individual member 
of the group.” (citations omitted). 
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Bagenstos hints, albeit rather vaguely, at an additional 
argument that I believe Persad would reject. He believes it 
might well be ethically (and legally?) required to reject any 
explicit rationing scheme (and move to a lottery system which is 
somehow viewed as something other than explicit or 
reason-based rationing?) because the observed shortages of 
medical resources (and the concomitant need for rationing) were 
generated through a political process in which people with 
disabilities have less political power than they would have in a 
system in which political power were appropriately distributed.9 
Alternatively, Bagenstos might merely be claiming that one 
reason we should be especially wary of any rationing scheme 
which harms the interests of people with disabilities is that they 
were underrepresented in the political decision making process, 
both in selecting a rationing scheme and in establishing health 
care systems that determine the need for rationing.10 
 
What makes this case a bit more difficult is that it is not clear that there are 
any reasonable individualized predictors of life expectancy that do not rely on, 
or at least account for, disability status. More generally, life expectancy, unlike 
lifting strength, can never be simply be currently observed: it is inevitably a 
prediction based on other observable facts. And to follow up on Persad’s 
example, it is unlikely that we would conclude that a particular patient who 
has cystic fibrosis has an atypically short life expectancy without attending to 
and accounting for the fact that he has cystic fibrosis. 
 9. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining the questionable 
legitimacy of a rationing process that “place[s] the burden of resource scarcity 
on disabled individuals – the very individuals who are most likely to have been 
excluded from such decisions”); see also id. at 13 
The perceived need to deny ventilators to coronavirus patients with 
pre-existing disabilities results not from scarcity as a natural fact, 
but from two societal decisions: first, the decision to fail to maintain 
an adequate stock of ventilators to serve all patients who would 
need them if a pandemic breaks out; second, the decision, once a 
pandemic breaks out, to use patients’ pre-existing disabilities as a 
basis for denying them the use of those devices. A process in which 
people with disabilities were equally represented vis-à-vis the 
nondisabled, and in which the interests of both groups were given 
equal concern, would not lead to both of these decisions. An equal 
process might instead have chosen to obviate the second decision by 
maintaining a sufficient stock of ventilators to serve every patient 
in the event of a pandemic. 
 10. It is not as clear as would be ideal what Bagenstos means when he 
claims that people with disabilities (all? a particular subset?) lack appropriate 
political power in recent years. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 10 (“People 
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The (possible) claim that all political decisions are legally 
impermissible, full stop, if they adversely affect a group that had 
too little power in making the decision or, even more broadly, in 
making decisions that impacted the perceived need to make the 
particular decision is breathtaking, and not in the good sense. I 
take it as given that Blacks as a group are adversely impacted 
by many state legislative decisions setting criminal penalty 
levels, and that they neither have adequate influence over these 
particular decisions nor decisions, e.g., about how to allocate 
educational funds, that doubtless indirectly impact the 
perceived need for harsh criminal penalties by creating 
conditions in which, say, more people of color have reduced 
non-criminal economic opportunities.11 It is one thing to say that 
the democratic provenance of a state action is relevant in 
assessing its legitimacy and quite another to adopt a lexical, 
non-compensatory scheme12 in which the recognition that a 
 
with disabilities have faced a long history of exclusion from democratic 
participation.”). I assume he might be echoing conventional concerns that they 
have less power than their numbers would suggest they should have because 
they find it atypically difficult to form coalitions with others or that others 
attend less to their interests than they would attend to the interests of 
non-disabled fellow citizens. See id. (characterizing the lack of political power 
as “exclusion [that] has resulted from an accumulation of decisions that made 
it impossible for many disabled people to have access to the political process”). 
I will take it as true for argument’s sake that the disabled community still 
lacks “appropriate” levels of political power, though I am not sure this is really 
true: GOP members of Congress who have tended to be generally restrictive 
in enacting both civil rights-protective measures and regulatory measures 
(like accommodation requirements) that mandate costly business practices 
nonetheless voted overwhelmingly for the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
though they have been much more prone than Democrats in the past two 
decades to seek to roll ADA protections back. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Would 
Republicans Support the Americans with Disabilities Act Today?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (July 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/9BMM-CNX8 (explaining that ADA 
was a “point of extraordinary consensus” at the time of enactment but that it 
“could fail in Congress[] if it were introduced as new legislation today”). 
 11. See David A. Lieb, Divided America: Minorities Missing in Many 
Legislatures, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y86E-PX2K 
(describing minority underrepresentation in state legislatures and its 
“real-life consequences” across a variety of issues).   
 12. The easiest way to think about what a lexical decision-making scheme 
entails is to consider how we compare the size of two numbers: when judging 
whether one number is larger than another, we make the decision lexically. If 
number N has more thousands, the fact that another number N has more 
 
256 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 249 (2021) 
 
political outcome might have been different had all 
subordinated groups been adequately empowered ends all 
further inquiry into the permissibility of the outcome. Adequate, 
fulsome representation has, quite justifiably, never been treated 
as something akin to a side-constraint on legitimate policy 
formation. 
Throughout this piece, I emphasize the ways in which 
Bagenstos uses various undefended non-compensatory/lexical 
or side-constraint schemes. My claim is that he does not really 
argue that lexical views are appropriate in this case; instead, he 
“performs” some imprecisely-defined “support for the 
subordinated” as a quasi-lexical trump,13 and this 
 
hundreds or tens or ones is of no moment. (4,123 is larger than 3,999 because 
4 > 3!). Domination along one dimension obviates the need to consider further 
factors. 
  Decision-making schemes are conventionally dubbed 
non-compensatory when it is the case that the presence of a good feature or 
several defined good features cannot be outweighed or compensated for by the 
presence of bad features (or that the presence of a bad feature or features 
cannot be compensated for by the presence of good features). For a discussion 
of non-compensatory cognitive processes, generally, skeptical of the 
descriptive claim made by some psychologists that people in fact make both 
judgments of fact and decisions about what option best serves their interests 
in a non-compensatory way, see MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 8, 66, 
104–12, 121–24, 172–74 (2011). 
 13. I leave aside several important issues as well as a more trivial one. If 
one decides that one can resolve any dispute by “siding with the subordinated,” 
one certainly need not believe that in each dyadic dispute the representative 
of the more subordinated community must prevail: no one as far as I know 
thinks that a Black defendant in a lawsuit should inevitably prevail by virtue 
of his subordination against a straight white male plaintiff without regard to 
further facts about the suit. That point seems trivial. 
  But it is a much harder question to know both how one resolves 
disputes in which each side is at least arguably subordinated and yet has 
clashing interests: for instance, does this rubric help us when we try to resolve 
a dispute over the propriety of disciplining a student with a behavior-affecting 
disability who claims that his harassment of his female classmates is a 
manifestation of his disability? Do we fix on the disabled student’s 
subordinated status or the female student’s? For a discussion of formal law 
and local practice protecting, to an uncertain extent, students with disabilities 
from being disciplined when they violate behavior codes, see MARK KELMAN & 
GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 60–63, 102–11 (1997). It is also a harder 
question whether it is a good thing to make legal rights or quasi-entitlements 
turn on painting oneself or one’s group as subordinated: there are plainly 
problems worth considering with incentivizing a culture of victimization. See 
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non-compensatory scheme improperly displaces a fuller 
consideration of the virtues and flaws of distinct policy 
proposals. 
Persad and Bagenstos most explicitly disagree on one key 
point, of course: Persad, but not Bagenstos, believes one could 
legitimately choose to give X rather than Y scarce life-saving 
resources if her life expectancy were longer, even if the use of 
life expectancy-based triage methods would disadvantage Y 
owing to her disability in the sense that her life expectancy is 
lower because of her disability and could disadvantage people 
with disabilities generally if their life expectancies are lower.14 
Bagenstos never explicitly argues either that life expectancy is 
an irrelevant, impermissible criterion (though he does note that 
he does not think there would be universal agreement that it is 
relevant)15 or that policies with disparate impact on a protected 
group, as the use of the life expectancy criterion would likely 
have, are invalid per se, even if group membership is 
statistically associated with a relevant criterion. 
But it is genuinely hard to tell what Bagenstos is claiming 
here. There is, of course, no version of disparate impact law that 
holds a practice invalid simply because members of a protected 
group receive fewer benefits or bear more costs than they would 
if the practice were not used: we always ask whether the 
practice is justified, whether it meets a legitimate end.16 
 
MARK KELMAN, WHAT IS IN A NAME? 72–88 (2019) (discussing claims made by 
religiously observant parties to be exempt from secular laws designed to, 
among other goals, decrease discrimination and by politically progressive 
students to coach demands to change the ideological content of their courses 
in antidiscrimination language). 
 14. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18–20 (criticizing Professor 
Persad’s use of “quantity-of-life” rationing criteria), with Persad, supra note 1, 
at 39 (explaining that “the law permits evidence-based medical judgments[,]” 
which includes “consideration of disabilities that limit lifespan,” “even when 
[those judgments] disadvantage patients with certain disabilities”). 
 15. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 17 (“Society does not, of course, 
universally endorse expected number of years of survival as a basis for 
discrimination in the provision of life-saving treatment.”). 
 16. Naturally, both burdens of production and proof might be allocated in 
different ways, and the allocation of these burdens might impact the likelihood 
that a party who wishes to use a practice with disparate impact would in fact 
be able to sustain the claim that the practice is indeed acceptable. See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (permitting employment discrimination when it 
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Occupational qualifications might exclude members of a 
protected group at high rates if members of the group typically 
lacked such qualifications but would nonetheless be permissible 
if they are correlated with actual on-the-job performance.17 
Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys attacking, say, discrimination in 
the administration of the death penalty do not merely ask 
whether Black defendants are sentenced to death at higher 
rates than non-Black defendants but ask whether they are 
sentenced at higher rates when they do not differ along 
dimensions relevant to sentencing.18 If I am right that 
Bagenstos does accept that significant differences in the 
probability that treatment will be efficacious are legitimate 
bases for allocating treatment, then he too accepts that people 
 
constitutes “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise”). 
 17. The canonical statements come from the first Title VII case 
expounding the disparate impact theory: 
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The 
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes [sic] cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . . Nothing in the Act 
precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously 
they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these 
devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are 
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971). Bagenstos of course 
acknowledges this basic conceptual point in his essay, both in discussing job 
qualifications and qualifications for receiving medical care. See Bagenstos, 
supra note 1, at 8 
To be sure, an individual’s disability may make it impossible or 
impracticable for them to satisfy certain eligibility criteria, even if 
the criteria are defined with no reference to disability. For example, 
a state may legitimately demand that bus drivers operate their 
vehicles safely; with current technology, blindness is simply 
inconsistent with that requirement. Safe operation of motor 
vehicles is an interest that can be defined without any reference to 
disability. The recognition that some disabilities, given the current 
state of technology, are simply incompatible with that interest 
reflects a simple and uncontroversial empirical judgment. 
 18. For a description of such a study, used in litigation challenging the 
death penalty in Connecticut, see generally John J. Donohue III, An Empirical 
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There 
Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 637 (2014). 
RATIONING IN COVID  259 
 
with disabilities might legitimately be disadvantaged by COVID 
care rationing schemes. For instance, people with Down 
Syndrome are ten times more likely to die from COVID: while 
the data does not yet fully clarify the extent to which the higher 
incidence is a result of a greater risk of contracting COVID or 
greater risk of dying from it, the latter appears to be a 
significant factor.19 
And it is not clear at all what traction Bagenstos thinks he 
gets from noting that there is no universal agreement that 
allocating scarce resources to those likely to live longest is the 
best rationing scheme.20 There is no universal agreement that 
longer prison terms, which disproportionately impact a 
protected group, are ideal policy either, but we obviously do not 
characterize all controversial practices with adverse impact as 
impermissibly discriminatory, even if we might believe it 
appropriate in evaluating a policy that it did not enjoy universal 
support (a minus) and had disparate impact (a clear minus as 
well). 
The question of when (if ever) it is appropriate to treat the 
violation of an interest—whether an individual’s “right” or a 
group’s interest in equality or greater degrees of social inclusion 
or the commitment to the use of a particular decision-making 
procedure—as obviating the need to analyze the fuller range of 
consequences that will result if the interest is violated is 
obviously a hugely charged political issue. One of many versions 
of the battle between deontologists and utilitarian 
consequentialists concerns the propriety of harming one 
individual to benefit others when the harm to that individual is 
(arguably) impermissible given some robust theory of inviolable 
side-constraining rights: we typically teach people about such 
controversies by asking them to consider whether it is 
permissible to convict a person one knows is innocent if the 
effects of the conviction (e.g., in deterring future crimes) are 
adequately propitious, or whether one can shoot an innocent 
 
 19. See Mary Van Beusekom, Down Syndrome Tied to 10 Times the Risk 
of COVID-19 Death, U. MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RSCH. & POL’Y (Oct. 
22, 2020), https://perma.cc/8YHQ-L2ZM (assessing whether the “the abnormal 
immune responses, congenital heart disease, and lung abnormalities common 
in people who have the syndrome could be risk factors for severe COVID-19 
illness”). 
 20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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person at the command of a madman who credibly threatens to 
kill five other innocents if one doesn’t,21 or whether it is 
justifiable to push some mythical Fat Man to his death on a 
mythical Trolley track when that mythical Fat Man would block 
the out-of-control Trolley from running over and killing five 
people somehow stuck on the track.22 And, of course, among 
those who believe that there are certain things we should never 
do regardless of the beneficial consequences, there are 
disagreements about which side-constraints bind our actions.23 
Mainstream libertarians, of course, believe that redistributive 
taxation designed to fund transfer programs to aid the poor 
breaches what should be inviolable side-constraining ownership 
rights while others believe that such governmentally-compelled 
transfers are morally obligatory.24 There are also frequent 
disputes about whether interests that we generally treat as 
side-constraints are truly absolute or are overridden in some 
circumstances. For example, does the ordinary “right” to be free 
from trespass dissipate when the trespass is “necessary” (and 
what kinds of necessity—health and safety only? property 
damage?—and level of necessity—how much property 
damage?—are adequate?).25 When we say that an employment 
 
 21. See Tim Stelzig, Deontology, Governmental Action, and the 
Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley Problem Shapes the Relationship 
Between Rights and Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 904–05 (1998); Bernard 
Williams, A Critque of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 
97–99 (J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (offering these 
scenarios). 
 22. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1395, 1409 (1984) (describing the “Fat Man” case). 
 23. See Stelzig, supra note 21, at 901–03 (concluding that torture of a 
child is morally impermissible regardless of any public good that may come of 
it). 
 24. See Daniel Markovits, Essay, How Much Redistribution Should There 
Be, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2325 (2003) (describing the philosophical 
disagreement between pro-redistribution egalitarianism and the libertarian 
thinking that redistributive taxation “enslaves the talented”). 
 25. For an argument that current law is unduly restrictive in prohibiting 
trespass, which should be thought of as justified or adequately necessary in 
more circumstances than it is today, see generally Ben Depoorter, Fair 
Trespass, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1090 (2011). For his brief discussion of the 
limited scope of formal necessity doctrine in existing law, see id. at 1100. For 
his claim that even exiting law permits trespass to occur even in situations in 
which it does not invoke formal necessity doctrine, see id. at 1101–09. 
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practice with disparate impact is justified by “business 
necessity,” do we mean that it is justified only if the business 
would literally fold if it is prohibited from using the practice or 
do we mean that it is justified, if, for instance, the use of the 
practice simply increases plant-wide productivity by selecting 
more capable workers?26 
Once again, it is not clear whether Bagenstos is really 
claiming that a practice that disadvantages a socially 
subordinated group (in this case, those with disabilities) is 
 Per se invalid, without consideration of further facts; or 
 That a practice that disadvantages in a particular 
“discriminatory” way is invalid (and if so, how we should 
define the form of discrimination that is invariably 
impermissible); or 
 That while it would be permissible to account for other 
interests even when one disadvantaged a subordinated 
group, in this particular case the interests that Persad 
highlights (maximizing the expected life years of the 
affected patient population)27 is either intrinsically 
illegitimate or just not very weighty; or 
 That the possibility that Persad’s rubric will be 
administered in a discriminatory fashion (doctors will 
underestimate the life expectancy of those with 
disabilities) renders it invalid (or should merely be 
weighed in judging its validity or in policing more 
vigorously how the scheme is implemented);28 or 
 
 26. See, e.g., Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1996) 
(reviewing the issue of “whether the term ‘necessity’ in the business necessity 
defense literally requires that the discriminatory practice be essential to the 
continued viability of the business, or whether it requires something less”). 
 27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.   
 28. When it comes to administering the scheme that he finds 
permissible—rationing care to those for whom it will be efficacious—he pretty 
clearly thinks we must simply be careful that it is administered properly, 
without conscious or unconscious reliance on the false idea that people with 
disabilities will be unable to benefit from care that he presumes will exist. See 
Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4 
A proper interpretation of the law may permit medical providers to 
use disability as a basis for a rationing decision where an 
individual’s underlying disability makes the individual unable to 
benefit from coronavirus treatment—either because that disability 
interferes with the treatment itself, or because the underlying 
disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of 
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 That there is a possibility that past discriminatory acts 
have suppressed life expectancy for people with 
disabilities and those with disabilities shouldn’t be 
“double-penalized” by these discriminatory acts (and 
again, whether the possibility of “double penalties” 
would render the proposed rubric invalid or simply be a 
factor to be weighed in evaluating the proposal).29 
 There are interesting discussions to be had about each 
and every one of these issues. For instance, my own sense is that 
if one were to argue that “discriminatory” acts are 
impermissible, per se, without regard to any putative legitimate 
gains one realizes if one takes them, the definition of 
discriminatory would have to be narrowed significantly to avoid 
unacceptable outcomes carefully. It is not my main point here, 
by any means, but I should confess that I am skeptical about the 
use of non-compensatory decision making across the board, as 
anything other than a heuristic30 designed to protect against 
errors that may result from the use of a fuller consequentialist 
analysis.31 Still, I believe a reasonable case can be made that 
 
the treatment’s success in addressing the virus. But those 
circumstances will be narrow. And a proper interpretation of the 
law requires assurances that such imminent-death determinations 
will be made based on the best available objective evidence, free 
from bias against people with disabilities or devaluation of their 
lives. 
 29. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18  
[F]ew would defend rationing ventilators based on a patient’s race 
or wealth—even if it would be a good proxy for number of years of 
expected survival following treatment. We recognize that race and 
wealth are morally arbitrary for these purposes, that minorities 
and poor people were disproportionately excluded from the 
decisions about how to invest in healthcare, and that requiring 
them to forgo life-saving treatment because of their groups’ poor life 
expectancy inflicts a kind of double jeopardy. The disability 
discrimination laws place disability on a similar plane. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 30. For these purposes, suffice it to say that “people are employing 
heuristics whenever they make a judgment or reach a decision without making 
use of some information that could be relevant.” See HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
 31. Political theorists generally dubbed “rule utilitarians” (as opposed to 
act utilitarians)  believe that it is often wise to forego case-by-case analysis of 
whether a practice is justified, all things considered, for many reasons (e.g., 
because people can only be expected to learn and obey simple rules that have 
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collective policies (like those at stake in the rationing case) that 
are sensible only if one discounts (or underweights) the interests 
of members of a subordinated group in constructing social 
welfare functions might well always be deemed impermissible 
as should individual actions that produce gains only because 
those taking the actions gain utility from the suffering of those 
in the disadvantaged group.32 But I don’t think a case can be 
 
no complex exceptions, because people will find facts in particular cases in an 
overly self-interested way, because act-utilitarian schemes that demand that 
one always does what has the best overall consequences might be too 
demanding for those who would prefer to display partiality towards some and 
would be relieved by a rule that permitted them to show partiality, for 
instance, to their family members without having to determine whether such 
partiality was beneficial, all things considered, in the particular case.) See 
Richard B. Miller, Actual Rule Utilitarianism, 106 J. PHIL. 5, 17 (2009) 
(explaining that the “essence of Rule Utilitarianism” is that one should not 
“evaluate actions in terms of the particular consequences of particular 
actions, . . . but rather evaluate[] actions according to the consequences of a 
system”); see also id. at 9–11 (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of rule 
utilitarianism). Thus, for instance, one might want to say that it is never 
justified to lie (or to lie in an official proceeding) or that one must always stop 
at a red light. In that sense, the truth-telling and stop-on-red rules undergird 
lexical or noncompensatory decision-making. One might believe these 
obligations hold even when one believes in the particular case that there are 
compensatory virtues to lying or proceeding because one might believe, among 
other reasons, that one’s judgments about whether lying or proceeding is 
beneficent are too likely to be self-serving or under-informed. See id. at 10–11 
(summarizing the harm of individual judgment to the public). For a classic 
discussion and defense of rule utilitarianism, see generally RICHARD B. 
BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979). 
  Actually, much of my hesitation about the use of QALYs—see supra 
note 5—is grounded in the rule utilitarian belief that even though there might 
well be particular cases in which I believe that it would be appropriate to 
differentiate the “quality” of two patient’s life years in making rationing 
decisions (e.g., X but not Y is in a coma; X but not Y has advanced ALS or 
dementia), the use of a no-QALY “heuristic” protects against both serious 
errors of under-valuation of the interests of people with less typical physical 
and mental abilities and errors that result simply from assuming to an 
unwarranted degree that one’s own picture of a better life is universally 
shared. 
 32. In the past, Bagenstos has rejected the idea that it is sensible in the 
context of antidiscrimination law to engage in what utilitarian theorists have 
called “preference laundering”—refusing to count the gains realized by 
satisfying certain bad tastes (like sadistic tastes or, in this case, animus-based 
tastes)—but he was, in that context, not really addressing the issue of whether 
discriminatory action was per se invalid but the issue of whether there were 
 
264 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 249 (2021) 
 
made that Persad’s plan appears sensible only because we have 
implicitly (and unacceptably) discounted the interests of 
members of the subordinated group or that any social policy that 
is less favorable to or inclusive of all disabled people is per se 
impermissible. And I don’t believe that any “weaker” version of 
what it means to discriminate justifies treating 
“non-discrimination” obligations as absolute side-constraints. It 
is hard to tell whether Bagenstos agrees with this normative 
framework. It is hard to tell what factual and normative claims 
lead him to think that Persad’s proposal to account for life 
expectancy is not just less than ideal, but illegitimate. 
 The reason, I think, that it is so hard to pin down what 
these claims are is that Bagenstos uses allegiance to the 
disability community and concern for that community’s welfare 
as a rhetorical trump, not as a formal trump. (I use the term 
“formal trump” to mean an inviolable side-constraint, to mean 
that acting on that allegiance is the basis of a lexical 
decision-making rubric.) Listing all the ways in which people in 
the subordinated identity group could be hurt by a contested 
practice ends debate, without either detailed normative 
discussion of whether the fact of injury really renders the 
practice impermissible or a detailed factual discussion of how 
serious or prevalent the harms really are.33 He is “performing” 
 
sensible reasons to distinguish “antidiscrimination” and “accommodation” 
norms. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and 
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 885–89 (2003) 
(evaluating the “antidiscrimination” versus “accommodation” distinction). He also 
expressed strong hesitations about trying to ascertain when people’s actions reflect 
the fact that they discount the interests of others in historically subordinated 
groups. Id. at 852–54, 866–67 (expressing skepticism about determining when 
discrimination is based on the “intentional devaluing of another’s interests”). It is a 
complex question, that I set aside here, whether decisions that are sensible only to 
those operating on (certain particular sorts of) stereotypes about members of 
subordinated groups should also perhaps be deemed per se unacceptable. 
 33. Bagenstos suggests (without straightforwardly asserting) that it is 
the case that we cannot use even a conceptually valid plan if it is likely to be 
used in a discriminatory manner. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 20 
Persad’s argument depends on the existence of “evidence-based” 
assessments of how a pre-existing disability affects life 
expectancy—and it depends on the evidence being good. But the 
biases I discussed . . . should lead to great skepticism about the 
quality of the “evidence” supporting express disability-based 
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a lexical decision rubric, grounded in what he rightly sees as the 
profound importance of addressing identity-based group 
subordination, but neither defending the uses of strict lexical 
schemes nor evaluating how the practice he is ostensibly 
interrogating would fare if we considered all of the possibly 
relevant facts. 
A second COVID-related case might be useful in thinking 
about what I mean when I describe Bagenstos as “performing” 
a lexical decision-making scheme. It is a particularly salient 
example for me not only because I think the lexical 
decision-making scheme I decry led to the correct bottom-line 
decision in the particular case, but because I think I myself used 
the very sort of lexical scheme in evaluating the proposals that 
I am condemning here, even though I think I am usually 
sensitive to rejecting such schemes. Last spring, law schools had 
to make a decision as to whether to switch over to mandatory 
pass/fail grading. I think all of us I would describe as having 
broadly centrist or progressive sympathies made the decision 
via this sort of one-stop anti-subordination performativity, in 
part because this method has become so routinized in our 
political sub-communities. As soon as the argument was made 
(correctly) that some students of color and First Gen/Low 
Income students would have a harder time with online learning 
than more privileged students (given, e.g., distinctions in access 
to dependable Internet connections or more demands from 
family members more likely to be adversely impacted, both 
economically and in health terms, by the pandemic), none of was 
willing to consider anything more. There was no empirical 
inquiry (how many students from subordinated communities 
would face these problems? what steps might the school take to 
overcome problems of unequal access to technology? how much 
 
exclusions or deprioritizations in a rationing plan. A key goal of 
antidiscrimination laws is to counteract those sorts of biases.  
But to reach that conclusion, we need a great deal more normative clarification 
than he offers to begin to figure out what level of discriminatory 
implementation invalidates a plan. And we also need far more data about the 
mistaken life expectancy predictions doctors have made or will make. It is not 
enough to say that doctors generically think “people with disabilities” will live 
less long than they actually will: many people with disabilities (e.g., certain 
cancers, cystic fibrosis) obviously do have a lower life expectancy because of 
their disability (and that lower life expectancy is not obviously related across 
the board to any past discriminatory mistreatment that they have received). 
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harder would school be for them? how much worse was the 
disadvantage during the pandemic relative to the advantages of 
privilege in ordinary times?) And there was no real effort to 
interrogate our own norms either: what are the virtues and 
flaws of grading generally? how will employers make decisions 
if students have not received grades and will some of the 
methods that they use entrench unjustified privilege in ways 
that should especially concern those who want to protect 
historically subordinated students? what are the virtues and 
flaws of reducing the number of grades students received before 
they went on the conventional job market? Of course, even from 
the perspective of those who reject non-compensatory 
decision-making, it was important to weigh the special burdens 
the pandemic imposed on already-disadvantaged students in 
reaching a decision on the proper course to follow, in the same 
way that we ought to attend to distributional concerns in 
evaluating policy choices across the board, but my point is that 
one almost surely needs to consider more to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion. 
By using disability rights as a rhetorical trump here, 
Bagenstos dismisses Persad’s argument that life expectancy 
matters without interrogating or explaining his own beliefs 
about that extremely difficult normative question.34 It is 
 
 34. Bagenstos does briefly note that there are some reasons to believe 
that Persad’s principle might not be compelling—e.g., the fact that one might 
prefer to save a thirty-year-old rather than an eighty-year-old might not be 
based on comparing their prospective life expectancies but on thinking that 
the eighty-year-old has already, retrospectively, lived a full life and the 
younger person should be given the chance to do the same. See Bagenstos, 
supra note 1, at near footnote 16 
Even if we focus on those who do agree that age is an appropriate 
criterion, it is far from clear that they hold that position because 
they believe health systems should maximize the number of 
life-years saved. Many people defend the use of age based on 
grounds that are backward rather than forward looking—“the 
feeling that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of 
health . . . .” 
If that is why we should favor the thirty-year-old, though, there is less reason 
to differentiate the treatment of two sixty-five-year-old patients based on how 
long they might still have to live or to favor a twenty-five-year-old over a 
thirty-five-year-old, neither of whom has experienced a “normal life span” 
simply because the younger patient is projected to live longer. 
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striking that we never see him work through the difficult 
normative question or reveal how he resolved it, or whether the 
arguments he is relying on resemble arguments that readers 
might find appealing (or unpersuasive) in other contexts.35 Nor 
 
  Once more, one of the reasons I think it is so difficult to recommend 
any particular rationing scheme with an even modest degree of assurance is 
that our ethical intuitions in this area are both complex and difficult to defend. 
For instance, my own intuition is that certain life expectancy distinctions 
should be of little consequence even though they may appear to be of 
substantial magnitude. In that sense, I would agree with Bagenstos that we 
should not simply seek (as Persad arguably does) to maximize the number of 
life years lived by the population. For example, I would not be predisposed to 
prioritize fifty-year-old Patient X with a life expectancy of thirty-five years 
over Patient Y (perhaps a Type-2 diabetic who smokes) with a life expectancy 
of twenty years but would be predisposed to prioritize seventy-year-old Patient 
Q with a life expectancy of fifteen years over seventy-year-old Patient R (with 
significant congestive heart failure that is not so likely to be imminently fatal 
that he would qualify for hospice care) whose life expectancy was between two 
and four years, even though this unquestionably harmed the interests of 
(disabled) CHF patients. But the collective dialogue that would allow us to 
accept or reject my intuitions would hardly be an easy or straightforward one 
and would not be advanced by ruling out the possibility of deprioritizing the 
CHF patient’s claims unless he faced imminent death, as Bagenstos would. 
 35. Although my goal here is not to defend the idea that we should use 
life expectancy-based rationing schemes, it is important to recognize that 
there are many reasons one could offer that make attending to life expectancy 
morally acceptable. For instance, people behind a veil of ignorance, not 
knowing whether they would be long or short-lived, might well prefer a policy 
that maximized life expectancy. Or, from a collective welfarist perspective, the 
state of affairs in which a given population lives longer generates higher levels 
of aggregate welfare so long as being alive is a positive experience (in hedonic 
welfare terms) or preferred (if one looks at this from a preference-utilitarian 
viewpoint) and has access to a higher amount of “primary goods.” It is 
consistent as well with a desire that I do not find especially compelling to treat 
one year of each and every individual’s life as precisely equally valuable. 
  My tentative intuition is that Bagenstos is (very covertly?) adopting 
views similar to those advanced by John Taurek, who argued that a moral 
actor would have no more reason to save five drowning people than one if he 
could only take one of those acts. See John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers 
Count? 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 293, 293–94 (1977) (rejecting the view that one 
should act to save the greatest number of people that one can). Taurek’s 
argument is one that most experimental subjects clearly reject. See Mark 
Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the 
Permissibility of Aggregation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 204–05, 
217 – 18 (2014) (“[W]e note the consistency with which subjects reject Taurek’s 
conclusion that the number of lives lost does not matter”). Taurek’s primary 
claim is that we can never sum experiences across persons—X’s death is never 
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does he answer the hard question mentioned before: does the 
fact that allocating to those with the greatest life expectancy is 
not the only acceptable answer to the rationing problem mean 
that it is a discriminatory and unacceptable answer to the 
problem? 
He also does not confront the challenging empirical 
questions that are inevitably raised if we take some of his 
worries seriously. If it is the case that we should worry about 
misestimation of the life expectancy of those with 
disabilities — and once again, it would be tremendously helpful 
to know if, and if so why, we should not merely consider that a 
problem that counts against the proposal or pushes us to work 
 
compensated for by Y’s increased life and to think that it does require believing 
that “society” is a moral entity. See Taurek, supra, at 309–10 (questioning the 
concept of collective pain and the concomitant existence of a moral duty to save 
as many as possible). He further argues that it is inappropriate to attend to 
decisions that people would have made ex ante about preferred policies rather 
than show them equal regard in whatever position they find themselves ex 
post: thus, he says, if there are five folks on a rock to the left of the person with 
the lifesaving rowboat that can only make one lifesaving expedition, and just 
one on the right, one shows each of the six equal regard only by flipping a coin 
to decide whether to go one rock or the other, insuring that each has a 50/50 
chance of being saved. See id. at 303 (“Why not give each person an equal 
chance to survive? Perhaps I could flip a coin.”). I take it in much the same 
way Bagenstos might be drawn to the idea that one only shows equal regard 
for low life expectancy people with disabilities and those with longer life 
expectancies by giving them an equal chance of receiving treatment, without 
regard to the impact on what should be treated as a morally fictional entity, 
“social welfare.” But I honestly cannot tell whether Bagenstos would embrace 
Taurek’s view or whether he would endorse any of the standard counterclaims 
to that claim (e.g., if we treat the person A alone on Rock 1 with the same 
regard as we treat person B on Rock 2, we should still go to Rock 2 unless we 
are treating people C, D, E, and F with no regard at all in the sense that they 
don’t influence our decision; all six could maximize their chance of survival 
assuming they don’t know which rock they will end up on if we adopt the “save 
more” rule). And my inability to sort through how Bagenstos resolves this 
issue reflects what I perceive as an unwillingness to face these thorny 
normative questions that is facilitated by adopting the anti-subordination 
rhetorical trope. Obviously, Taurek’s argument more directly bears on the 
question of whether we might justifiably ration care so that available care 
could be given to more patients, favoring using resource R to treat two patients 
efficaciously rather than one who required a higher quantity of R. And would, 
in Bagenstos’s view, this be permissible even if patients with disabilities more 
often required more treatment resources to be treated as efficaciously? Persad 
is clear that it is permissible in his view to attend to the quantity of resources 
that need to be utilized to save an individual when rationing scarce resources. 
Persad, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
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harder on program implementation rather than a problem that 
invalidates it36—it would help to know how frequently life 
expectancy is misestimated and for which types of disabilities.37 
If merely asserting the possibility of unwarranted disadvantage 
to a subordinated community suffices to cut off further inquiry 
into any other goals or factual considerations that might 
militate in favor of taking account of remaining life years, then 
we will disregard the legitimate interests of people both within 
and outside the subordinated community. 
Maybe it is appealing, or at least straightforward, to allow 




 36. It is simply not clear in this context whether Bagenstos thinks we 
should be dealing with the sorts of balancing issues that compensatory 
consequentialists rightly forefront. If there is some measure of misestimation 
that is unfair to people with disabilities but ignoring life expectancy across the 
board badly misallocates scarce medical resources according to other 
compelling criteria, what do we do? 
  Generally speaking, it is very difficult to determine when it is 
appropriate to police discriminatory applications of a practice that we will 
nonetheless allow to continue and when we must abolish the practice because 
we recognize that there will be discriminatory applications. We might think it 
appropriate to abolish the death penalty altogether—even without regard to 
one’s general moral attitudes about the death penalty—because it would be 
applied in a discriminatory fashion, but not think we would forbid firms from 
hiring or firing on anything but a lottery basis because they hire and fire in a 
discriminatory fashion. Instead, we should attempt to regulate hiring and 
firing so as to diminish discrimination, even if we despair that we will not 
completely eliminate it. Plainly, in making those sorts of distinctions, we 
consider both the possibility that discriminatory instances of a practice can be 
identified and rooted out and the viability of substituting a distinct practice 
for the one that might be administered in an unacceptable fashion. We also 
consider, of course, both the frequency of discriminatory applications and the 
consequences of unjust application to the affected parties. My own view is that 
Bagenstos could have made a reasonably persuasive case that the losses from 
moving to a system less likely to be administered in a discriminatory fashion 
might be relatively low and the consequences of discriminatory application 
especially high in this class of cases. 
 37. Presumably, if we believe that doctors underestimate the life 
expectancy for certain sub-groups of disabled people but not for others, we 
might want to fix the misestimation problem for those sub-groups rather than 
ditch the program altogether. 
